Judicial Selection by the Numbers by Gerhardt, Michael J.
University of North Carolina School of Law
Carolina Law Scholarship
Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
2005
Judicial Selection by the Numbers
Michael J. Gerhardt
University of North Carolina School of Law, gerhardt@email.unc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Law Commons
Publication: Florida State University Law Review
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.
1197 
JUDICIAL SELECTION BY THE NUMBERS 
MICHAEL J. GERHARDT* 
 I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................  1197 
 II. MERIT................................................................................................................  1199 
A. The Conventional, Elitist Definition of Merit ............................................  1199 
B. The Public as Arbiter of Merit: Social Scientists Do Not Have a Uniform 
Conception of Merit ....................................................................................  1201 
C. Assumptions on Which Most People Agree.................................................  1203 
1. Imagining the Ideal Judicial Nominee................................................  1203 
(a) Professional Experience and Accomplishments.............................  1204 
(b) Legal Acumen ................................................................................  1205 
(c) Judicial Temperament ..................................................................  1205 
(d) Writing Skills ................................................................................  1206 
(e) Integrity and Character.................................................................  1206 
(f) Other Factors.................................................................................  1208 
(g) Empirical Complications...............................................................  1208 
2. Determining Merit in Reverse..............................................................  1210 
D. Assumptions on Which Few People Agree ..................................................  1212 
 III. THE BATTLE OVER THE MAINSTREAM IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.......................  1215 
A. Problems with Defining the Middle in Constitutional Law.......................  1217 
B. Sketching the Middle .................................................................................  1220 
 IV. PROVING (HOW MUCH) IDEOLOGY MATTERS.....................................................  1223 
A. Fixing Ideology...........................................................................................  1223 
B. How to Show Ideology Matters...................................................................  1225 
1. Proving Judicial Ideology....................................................................  1226 
2. Senate Composition .............................................................................  1229 
3. Timing .................................................................................................  1230 
4. Sponsoring Senators ............................................................................  1230 
5. Presidential Popularity........................................................................  1231 
6. The Blue-Slip Process ..........................................................................  1231 
7. Numbers of Witnesses ..........................................................................  1232 
8. The American Bar Association ............................................................  1232 
9. Integrity ...............................................................................................  1233 
10. Merit.....................................................................................................  1233 
 V. CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................  1234 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 The lure of doing empirical research in legal scholarship is strong, 
but the appeal of critiquing judicial selection is stronger. So it is 
rather surprising that empirical analysis figures very little in the vo-
luminous legal commentary on judicial selection. Instead, legal 
scholars devote little attention to the actual numbers in judicial se-
lection; they generally defer to, or merely accept, the empirical work 
                                                                                                                     
 * Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School; Visiting Fellow, 
James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions, Princeton University, 
Spring 2004. I am grateful to Scott Baker and Mitu Gulati for helpful comments on an ear-
lier draft. My contribution to this Symposium is an expanded version of my essay entitled 
Merit vs. Ideology, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 353 (2005). 
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done by others, particularly social scientists, on judicial selection. 
While some of these studies are excellent,1 many have problems. In 
this Essay, I explore three basic challenges to doing empirical studies 
of judicial selection and suggest ways to meet these challenges. My 
hope is to give some useful guidance to legal scholars and others in-
terested in developing a more sophisticated understanding of the ju-
dicial selection process through empirical analysis.  
 The first challenge, discussed in Part II, is defining merit. Many 
legal scholars rarely discuss merit in their commentaries on judicial 
selection, even though developing a coherent notion of merit is essen-
tial for evaluating the quality of judicial nominations. Consequently, 
in Part II, I examine the empirical challenges posed by several plau-
sible definitions of merit. This discussion should help to illuminate, 
inter alia, the importance of merit as a normative criterion for judi-
cial selection as well as the significant relationship between merit 
and the one thing almost all commentators assume is a principal 
driving force in judicial selection: Ideology, by which I mean pre-
commitments to certain outcomes or approaches for analyzing consti-
tutional issues, regardless of the facts of particular cases. 
 In Part III, I examine the benefits of avoiding the popular practice 
of labeling judicial nominees on the bases of their supposed ideolo-
gies. Politicians and social scientists share a strong proclivity to pi-
geonhole judges and Justices based on their supposed ideologies, but 
their labels tend to be overly simplistic, inaccurate, incomplete, mis-
leading, and value-laden. They tend to obscure, if not ignore, the sub-
tle differences in judicial philosophies as well as the basic fact that 
some Justices and judges do not have fixed ideologies either at the 
time of their initial appointments or perhaps ever. Moreover, because 
of ideological drift (and other factors), the categories scholars and 
others use in analyzing judicial performance are not static. Perhaps 
the most serious problem with labeling is that it obscures the middle, 
or the mainstream, in American constitutional jurisprudence. Politi-
cians fight to place their nominations within the mainstream for a 
reason: It provides a benchmark against which to measure politi-
cians’ and others’ characterizations of judicial performance. Each 
side strives to include its nominees within the mainstream and to 
push the other side’s outside of it. Moreover, each side has a strong 
incentive to push the envelope in confirmation proceedings, because 
it will help expand the safe ground available to its nominees but 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See, e.g., SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT 
SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN (1997); Lee Epstein et al., The Norm of 
Prior Judicial Experience and Its Consequences for Career Diversity on the U.S. Supreme 
Court, 91 CAL. L. REV. 903 (2003). 
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situate the other side’s nominees closer to, if not beyond, the outside 
of the mainstream.  
 In Part IV, I explore possible empirical tests for determining the 
relative impacts of almost a dozen factors on the fates of judicial 
nominations. These recommendations will help legal scholars (and 
others) move beyond their unfounded assumptions about the forces 
driving federal judicial selection and be more precise with the terms 
they employ for characterizing judicial qualifications or performance. 
While it may never be possible to bridge the divide among national 
political leaders on such basic things as defining merit or ideology in 
judicial selection, empirical research at least holds the promise of il-
luminating common ground for those outside the process to evaluate 
what happens inside of it.   
II.   MERIT 
 In this Part, I examine a basic question that presumably is of 
great interest to everyone concerned with the quality of judging: How 
do we measure fitness for office and, particularly, how do we deter-
mine who are the best qualified people for appointment to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the U.S. courts of appeals, and U.S. district courts? 
There are several possible definitions of merit, each of which poses a 
challenge for empirical analysis of judicial selection. I discuss several 
possible definitions of merit and the respective empirical challenges 
posed by each of them. 
A.   The Conventional, Elitist Definition of Merit  
 One way to define merit is simply to examine how it has been de-
fined in the past. A review of the critical literature on merit indicates 
that, as a descriptive matter, critical elites have always defined merit 
to suit their own purposes.2 Different sectors and professions develop 
their own, self-serving conceptions of merit. With respect to judicial 
appointments, there has never been some objective, or neutral, crite-
rion of merit. Instead, the governing elite has made judicial ap-
pointments to further its own interests. Consequently, merit is de-
fined so as to allow for, if not to maximize, the appointments of rela-
tives, friends, and especially political allies.3 For any given presi-
dency or era, the essential tasks are to figure out the conception of 
merit advanced by the governing elite and how well nominees fit this 
                                                                                                                     
 2. See, e.g., Dawn E. Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court on Congres-
sional Power: Presidential Influences on Constitutional Change, 78 IND. L.J. 363 (2003) 
(noting that President Reagan employed a conception of merit based in large part on ad-
herence to the doctrine of original understanding). 
 3. Cf. KERMIT L. HALL, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE (1979) (describing the use of pa-
tronage in federal court appointments between the years 1829-1861). 
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particular conception. It has been quite common for Presidents to 
choose judicial nominees who not only share their constitutional vi-
sion but are also likely to be supportive of their administrations’ poli-
cies. For instance, President George Washington chose his judicial 
nominations based in part on their support for the ratification of the 
Constitution and commitment to Federalist ideals,4 while President 
Lincoln opted for judicial nominees who supported the Union and Re-
construction.5  
 There are, however, three major problems with relying on an in-
strumental conception of merit as an empirical measure of the qual-
ity of judicial nominations. First, the conception is unstable. It 
changes at least as often as the governing elite does. For instance, 
President Reagan, from 1980 through 1986, employed a conception of 
merit that included rigid commitment to original understanding.6 
Once Democrats took control of the Senate in 1986, the pressure 
mounted on President Reagan to moderate his definition. He soon 
did: After his first two nominations to replace then-retiring Justice 
Powell failed, President Reagan modified his conception of merit to 
settle on someone with more moderate views, Anthony Kennedy. 
President George H.W. Bush might have been disposed to employ the 
same definition of merit adopted originally by President Reagan. But 
facing a Democrat-controlled Senate, with a majority hostile to rigid 
commitments to original understanding, President Bush chose a 
candidate without a paper trail on ideology—David Souter—to re-
place then-retiring Justice Brennan.  
 Second, it is a mistake to assume the governing elite is candid 
about its conception of merit. In some cases, governing elites are not 
forthcoming—and some might go so far as to suggest they are decep-
tive—about their conception of merit. President George W. Bush in-
sists that merit is his principal selection criterion, but he has never 
given a detailed definition of his conception of merit. Nor does merit, 
however defined, seem to explain all his judicial nominations. For in-
stance, President Bush twice nominated and eventually made a re-
cess appointment of Charles Pickering, Sr., to a seat on the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, though Pickering was the most 
reversed district judge in his circuit. It is hard to explain Pickering’s 
appointment as based on some objective criterion of merit.  
 Third, the governing elite’s definition of merit works very poorly 
as a normative criterion. Using each administration’s definition of 
merit to evaluate its nominees allows it, not any external or inde-
                                                                                                                     
 4. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF THE 
U.S. SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 53-60 (new & rev. ed. 
1999). 
 5. See id. at 86-92. 
 6. See, e.g., Johnsen, supra note 2. 
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pendent source, to define the terms on which they may be measured. 
Each administration’s definition of merit is likely to be self-serving, 
so in all likelihood it would be a rare case—perhaps like Pickering’s 
nomination—that does not fit within its definition of merit. The less 
precise an administration is in defining merit, the easier it will be to 
show that its nominees satisfy it. Thus, it is conceivable that even 
Pickering can be defended as a merit appointment on some grounds, 
such as his longstanding experience as a district court judge and the 
respect that he has earned from the lawyers appearing before him as 
well as the members of local and state bar associations. Yet, the less 
precise an elite’s definition of merit, the less useful it becomes as a 
normative criterion, because it is not stringent enough to rule any-
thing out. Moreover, it would be extremely unfair to use one govern-
ing elite’s definition to measure the quality of an appointment made 
by a different governing elite, because they will have been likely de-
fined in opposition to each other. President Reagan’s definition of 
merit, for instance, was deliberately designed to contrast with the 
appointments of his Democratic predecessors as well as the politi-
cally moderate Gerald Ford. He chose his definition in part because it 
ruled out the likelihood of choosing people like those nominated to 
judgeships by Ford or Presidents Johnson and Carter.  
 Thus, the elite’s definitions of merit are of limited relevance to 
empirical research. To be sure, they may be useful for clarifying a 
particular administration’s expectations of its nominees. But elitist 
definitions of merit are unlikely to be useful in satisfying more ambi-
tious empirical objectives. Empirical research requires developing 
criteria with more explanatory potential and normative value. 
B.   The Public as Arbiter of Merit: Social Scientists Do Not Have a 
Uniform Conception of Merit 
 Some agree that merit is a purely instrumental concept. Perhaps 
the most aggressive advocates of this conception are Harold Spaeth 
and Jeffrey Segal. They argue that judicial selection is not based on 
any neutral conception of merit. Instead, they claim, Supreme Court 
Justices reflect the values, or preferences, of the governing elite.7 
They are chosen, in other words, because they are likely to uphold 
the values and preferences of the people who appoint them. Under-
standing judicial selection in this manner helps explain why Su-
preme Court Justices never stray far from standing behind the poli-
cies or cultural beliefs of the people who appointed them. Instead, 
Segal and Spaeth argue, Justices are picked on the basis of their 
                                                                                                                     
 7. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 86-97 (2002) (describing judges as motivated in their deci-
sionmaking primarily by personal policy preferences). 
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likely ideologies with respect to social policy. Once on the bench, they 
merely vote their policy preferences. 
 Many other social scientists take contrary viewpoints on merit. 
They believe that in empirical research it is important to ground a 
conception of merit in a source independent from, or external to, the 
actual judicial selection process. An external definition of merit is 
useful normatively, because it provides an arguably neutral bench-
mark detached from an actual Justice’s selection against which to 
measure his or her qualifications and performance. For instance, so-
cial scientists sometimes use the public as an external source for de-
fining merit. This definition allows researchers to measure judicial 
selection against public opinion.  
 In this Symposium, Lee Epstein and her coauthors suggest a 
variation on this approach. They suggest the media as one possible 
evaluator of merit.8 They consider merit as simply being whatever 
the media has defined it to be. This is, however, a problematic meas-
ure for several reasons. First, it is unclear why the media should be 
regarded as neutral on this matter. Indeed, many thoughtful people 
believe that the media is not neutral. They believe that the media 
has its own ideological agenda, which is likely to influence its cover-
age of events and its evaluations of the merits of judicial nominees. 
For instance, it is hard to imagine that The Wall Street Journal edi-
torial page or the Fox News Network will seriously question Presi-
dent Bush’s declarations about the merits of his judicial nominees.  
 Second, the media has no apparent interest in being or becoming a 
neutral arbiter of merit. There is no good reason to believe that the 
media has the public interest at heart and thus can be fairly or sen-
sibly viewed as acting on its behalf. By all accounts, the media loves 
to cover scandal and conflict. The need for the media to make money, 
coupled with intense competition arising from the twenty-four-hour 
news cycle and the Internet, has exacerbated the declining interest 
in simply reporting the hard news—that is, facts and figures.9 The 
media increasingly prefers to report soft news—that is, speculation 
and commentary.10 Drama is likely to attract reader or viewer inter-
est, and so the media increasingly reports as much drama as it can. 
A neutral assessment of merit, if it were to be made at all, is likely to 
be lost in the avalanche of soft news that dominates media reporting. 
Moreover, many commentators are not lawyers, and many of the 
                                                                                                                     
 8. Lee Epstein et al., The Role of Qualifications in the Confirmation of Nominees to 
the U.S. Supreme Court, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1145 (2005). 
 9. See Stephen Hess, Media to Government: Drop Dead, BROOKINGS REV., Winter 
2000, at 28 (suggesting that news coverage of and public interest in politics has declined). 
 10. See, e.g., MARVIN L. KALB, ONE SCANDALOUS STORY: CLINTON, LEWINSKY, AND 
THIRTEEN DAYS THAT TARNISHED AMERICAN JOURNALISM (2001); BILL KORACH & TOM 
ROSENTIEL, WARP SPEED: AMERICA IN THE AGE OF MIXED MEDIA (1999). 
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ones who are lawyers are unlikely to be neutral—they are likely to be 
fierce combatants for one extreme viewpoint on a nomination.  
 Third, the media lacks any expertise in evaluating merit. It is un-
clear why it should be supposed that the media generally has any 
special insight into the qualifications for judicial service. Some com-
mentators have law degrees and may have practiced law or served in 
government; however, most are not trained as lawyers. Moreover, 
many professions evaluate merit based on the assessments of those 
within the profession. Some quickly write this off as merely a custom 
or price of admission into a particular guild. While it may be true 
that professionals are not necessarily the only ones who can evaluate 
what they do professionally, it does not follow that professionals are 
ill equipped to evaluate each other’s professional performance. Thus, 
yet another important empirical study to undertake is measuring the 
extent to which a particular profession, such as legal practitioners or 
judges, is well equipped to evaluate its own practitioners.11 
C.   Assumptions on Which Most People Agree 
 One possible reason legal scholars do not discuss merit is because 
most of us—indeed, perhaps most people—share a number of as-
sumptions about merit in judicial selection. It is possible that with 
respect to merit we might have more consensus than generally ac-
knowledged. Thus, it is important to consider the assumptions about 
merit on which there may be substantial if not uniform agreement. 
Below, I consider two different ways for illuminating such assump-
tions and the problems with empirically demonstrating each, particu-
larly separating merit from ideology. 
1.   Imagining the Ideal Judicial Nominee 
 Imagine, for a moment, that you have been asked by the President 
to draft a list of qualifications for nominees to the Supreme Court 
and to other Article III courts. Imagine further that you do not know 
which particular President has made this request. You are, in other 
words, behind a Rawlsean veil of ignorance,12 for you do not know 
anything particular about whether this will ultimately help or hurt 
you, what kinds of cases will likely come before the courts, the Presi-
dent’s party, and the composition of the Senate. Is it possible to draft 
such a list, and if so, what qualities would be on the list? Below, I 
consider five possible qualities that could conceivably satisfy our col-
lective assumptions about merit.  
                                                                                                                     
 11. Cf. Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, 92 CAL. L. REV. 299 
(2004). 
 12. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE § 24 (rev. ed. 1999). 
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(a)   Professional Experience and Accomplishments 
 It is easy to see the importance of meaningful, first-hand profes-
sional experience to judicial selection. We want our judges and Jus-
tices to be familiar with the business and responsibilities of the 
courts to which they have been nominated. We do not want appoint-
ees to need on-the-job training. The ideal is someone whose experi-
ence specially qualifies her or him for judicial appointment.  
 The requisite experience might not be the same for every Article 
III court. Presumably, the ideal experience for a Supreme Court Jus-
tice is practicing before the Court and perhaps serving in other of-
fices, such as lower court judgeships, that employ similar (but not 
identical) skills. Meaningful experience might also include serving in 
a significant public office, for it might enrich the nominee’s under-
standing of the system from which the laws appealed to her Court 
will come. Rich professional experience is bound to sharpen nomi-
nees’ judgments and provide a solid foundation from which to ap-
proach the significant legal questions that come routinely before the 
Supreme Court.  
 The ideal experience for a federal court of appeals judge is sub-
stantial appellate practice or prior service as a judge on a comparable 
court or perhaps on a federal trial court. Meaningful experience 
might also include demonstrated or proven expertise in some areas of 
the law. The ideal may be that the leading practitioners or scholars 
in different fields would bring their respective expertise (and the 
skills that allowed them to develop it) to the task of judging.  
 The ideal experience for a district judge is substantial trial ex-
perience. Not all trial lawyers will make good district judges, but all 
good district judges presumably understand how to manage trials of 
all shapes and sizes and large caseloads. The ideal experience may 
also include service as a judge on a comparable court, such as a state 
supreme court. 
 Demonstrating empirically the extent to which judicial nominees 
have, or deviate from, ideal experience should not be difficult. We al-
ready have considerable data on the professional backgrounds of the 
people nominated to judgeships. For instance, we have the rates of 
affirmance and reversal for sitting judges. We can also count years 
devoted to legal practice and determine the relative weight to be as-
signed to the professional work nominees did prior to their nomina-
tions. Judicial nominees’ professional experience need not have been 
in the public sector, but the more firsthand experience with the legal 
system a nominee has, the better. We could assign more weight to 
public service experience, but we need not discount entirely other 
professional experience. Furthermore, we could measure familiarity 
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with the legal system based on the data gathered by bar groups or 
those who have worked closely with the nominees. 
(b)   Legal Acumen 
 We expect judicial nominees to have very high degrees of legal 
acumen. We expect judicial nominees to be highly intelligent, per-
haps to have performed quite well in law school, maybe even to have 
attended an elite law school. At the very least, we would want to 
make sure that the nominee has very sound legal skills; is capable of 
asking intelligent, probing questions; thinks critically (if not imagi-
natively) about legal problems; identifies legal issues in a wide range 
of problems; is trained at problem-solving; is diligent; and under-
stands the special duties that she will be called upon to discharge.  
 Measuring this criterion entails coordinating different data. There 
will be some objective data (such as the law school attended or the 
number of law review articles written) and some subjective data 
(such as measuring the opinions of the bar or those who have prac-
ticed before or with the nominees).  
(c)   Judicial Temperament 
 We expect judicial nominees to have excellent judicial tempera-
ment. The ideal temperament for a judge or Justice is presumably to 
have the capacity to make decisions evenhandedly, to be open-
minded in listening to and considering the arguments in the cases 
that come before him, and to be respectful to litigants and other ap-
pellate judges or Justices with differing opinions. A district judge 
may largely work alone in deciding cases but still needs a great deal 
of patience to sit through long trials and other legal proceedings. 
Moreover, a good judicial temperament requires, of course, a disposi-
tion to follow the law. Judicial nominees need, in other words, to 
demonstrate in some ways that they are well suited to resolving legal 
disputes rather than rewriting the laws they are interpreting. Judi-
cial nominees also need to be able to handle the intense pressures 
that come with the responsibilities of being judges or Justices.  
 Collegiality is a related measure of ideal judicial qualifications.13 
Collegiality requires getting along with the other Justices or judges 
with whom one must work. Collegiality also entails being able to 
build coalitions and to maintain cordial relations with other judges or 
Justices, regardless of the extent to which one may agree or disagree 
with their views in particular cases. Maintaining cordial relations is 
                                                                                                                     
 13. On the importance of collegiality, see Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality 
on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1639 (2003); and Harry T. Edwards, Col-
legiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1998). 
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no mean feat on the Supreme Court, which Justice Holmes once de-
scribed as “nine scorpions in a bottle.”14 Not all people who must 
work together in relatively close quarters successfully maintain re-
spect and civility over long periods of time, but the ideal nominee 
must have this capability. 
 Empirically demonstrating excellent judicial temperament or col-
legiality is not easy. To be sure, if nominees have had lots of verified 
complaints filed against them for temperamental outbursts, those 
would be signs of problems with temperament. If the complaints 
come from other judges, they undoubtedly will call into question a 
nominee’s collegiality. Moreover, taking temperament or collegiality 
into account invites unsubstantiated rumors or insinuations from 
critics. Measuring nominees’ collegiality or temperament thus re-
quires sorting fact from fiction. It requires, in other words, develop-
ing credibly neutral measurement.  
(d)   Writing Skills 
 Yet another criterion for the ideal nominee is excellent writing 
ability. This is particularly true for Supreme Court Justices and fed-
eral appellate judges, who are called upon to draft large numbers of 
opinions. The ideal Supreme Court or federal court of appeals nomi-
nee should be able to write clear, coherent opinions. It is especially 
important that the ideal nominee have the ability to craft opinions 
reflecting multiple viewpoints. Moreover, it is important for the 
nominee to be able to compose opinions relatively quickly given the 
time pressures under which judges and Justices operate.  
 Measuring writing ability involves both objective and subjective 
data. The objective data include judges’ productivity and the amount 
of time it takes for judges to produce opinions, particularly as com-
pared to the other judges with whom they regularly sit. The extent of 
a nominee’s nonjudicial writings may also be pertinent. It reflects, 
inter alia, their contributions (if not their leadership) in refining our 
understandings and reforms of different areas of the law. Subjective 
data include the quality of a nominee’s writings and speeches. The 
quality of the latter depends on the assessments of others, including, 
but not limited, to peers and experts.  
(e)   Integrity and Character 
 Integrity is essential to the ideal judicial nominee. A judicial 
nominee’s integrity must be beyond question in order for her or him 
                                                                                                                     
 14. E.g., MAX LERNER, NINE SCORPIONS IN A BOTTLE: GREAT JUDGES AND CASES OF 
THE SUPREME COURT (Richard Cummings ed., 1994); Richard A. Posner, A Tribute to Jus-
tice William J. Brennan, Jr., 104 HARV. L. REV. 13, 14 (1990) (attributing this statement to 
Justice Holmes). 
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to exercise the fragile moral authority of a Supreme Court Justice, 
federal court of appeals judge, or district judge. Judges and Justices 
embody the law, and they need to comply with the very laws they ex-
pect others to follow. If nominees have not followed the laws they ex-
pect others to follow and for whose violations they may sentence 
other people, they no longer can claim the special moral status on 
which their job depends. 
 Closely related to nominees’ integrity is their moral character. 
Stephen Carter and Larry Solum are just two of the many scholars 
who insist that a Supreme Court Justice ought to have a strong, 
moral character.15 At the very least, having a strong, moral character 
means having the courage of one’s convictions and the strength not to 
alter one’s opinions, or decide cases, for the sake of public or peer es-
teem.  
 Integrity and character are easier to measure in their absence 
than they are positively. For instance, criminal convictions would 
almost certainly disqualify someone from judicial appointment, 
though it is conceivable that if the crimes were misdemeanors and 
committed many years before the nominations they might be dis-
missed as irrelevant. Admissions or proof of wrongdoing further 
demonstrate problems with integrity or character. The fact that Jus-
tice Fortas continued after his appointment to give policy advice to 
President Johnson raised a question about his professional judg-
ment.16 Even worse, his accepting money from a convicted mobster 
was an ethical lapse,17 just as it is unethical for a judge or Justice to 
rule on cases involving former clients or companies in which he or 
she owned stock. Complaints made by spouses or children in custody 
disputes might raise questions about nominees’ characters; even if no 
criminal conduct were alleged, charges might be raised about the 
person’s moral judgment.  
 In the absence of documentation, integrity and character are es-
tablished through subjective data. They will be based largely on tes-
timonials from other people. Senators tend, however, to give more 
weight to negative appraisals. Because most nominees receive posi-
tive testimonials, the latter end up not receiving much attention un-
less they have come from people whose opinions carry great weight 
with Senators. In contrast, negative testimony draws much greater 
                                                                                                                     
 15. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL 
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 151-55 (1994); Lawrence B. Solum, A Tournament of Virtue, 32 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1365 (2005). 
 16. For an account of these interactions, see LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS 310-18 
(1990).  
 17. For an in-depth review of the events, see ROBERT SHOGAN, A QUESTION OF 
JUDGMENT: THE FORTAS CASE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SUPREME COURT (1972). 
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attention. It makes headlines, provokes lots of questions, and raises 
potentially fatal doubts.  
(f)   Other Factors 
 There are other qualifications that ideal nominees arguably need 
to satisfy. Besides the factors already mentioned, Presidents might 
also be interested in nominees’ religion, ethnicity, gender, and 
health. These other factors might be important in diversifying the 
composition of the federal courts or satisfying underrepresented 
segments of society. Moreover, nominees’ ages have been very impor-
tant to some Presidents who wanted to ensure that their appointees 
could continue to serve as judges and Justices long after they left of-
fice. 
(g)   Empirical Complications 
 Of course, the criteria that are relevant for determining ideal 
nominees are one thing, while the things at which Presidents or their 
advisers might look in order to measure actual nominees are quite 
another. The values of those charged with selecting a nominee will 
inevitably influence what they choose to look at and how they will 
perceive it. Moreover, it might simply be unrealistic—or reckless—to 
ignore factors such as timing, the President’s party, the composition 
of the Senate, the nominee’s political or party affiliation, or the com-
positions of individual federal courts. For instance, the composition of 
the Senate might be quite pertinent to a Supreme Court nominee’s 
chances of confirmation. Indeed, a President might be inclined to 
choose different people, depending on whether his party controls the 
Senate or whether the minority has enough members to filibuster a 
contested nomination. Certain factors are bound to complicate the 
nominating process. For instance, the proximity of the next presiden-
tial election cannot be ignored, since the opposing party has success-
fully rejected or delayed more than a few Supreme Court nominees in 
the hope of preserving the vacancies for Presidents from their 
party.18 And we have not yet mentioned a nominee’s likely ideology or 
how well a potential candidate interviews for the job as possible 
complicating factors.  
 Nor have I yet acknowledged other, arguably more serious prob-
lems with collective assumptions about merit. First, we still have to 
demonstrate empirically our collective assumptions about merit. It is 
one thing to assume we share some consensus on merit, but we need 
to show precisely what, if anything, our shared assumptions are. 
This requires figuring out whose opinions ought to count and how to 
                                                                                                                     
 18. See ABRAHAM, supra note 4. 
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figure them out. Second, even if there were shared assumptions 
about merit, there may not be any consensus on what kinds of activi-
ties or data satisfy our shared criteria for merit. For instance, it is 
possible there is relatively widespread consensus on the relevance of 
professional experience to judicial selection but not on which experi-
ences ought to count or on the relative weight (or relevance) of differ-
ent kinds of experience (say, public defender versus federal prosecu-
tor). Third, there may not be any consensus on the relative weight of 
different factors, such as experience and judicial temperament. Peo-
ple might have reasonable differences of opinion about how to priori-
tize different factors or whether one factor ought to count more than 
another. Nor may there be any consensus on the significance of an 
absent factor or how much weight to attach to a negative rating with 
respect to a particular criterion, such as judicial temperament. 
Again, people might have reasonable differences of opinion about 
what needs to be shown in order to disqualify a nominee altogether.  
 The large number of potential considerations helps to explain why 
some Presidents, or their advisers, might prefer to break the nomi-
nating process into first- and second-order selection criteria. The first 
might allow for a relatively sizeable list of potential candidates, while 
the second might be used to cut the list down to size (if not down to 
one). Interviews might be used to cut a narrowed list even further (at 
which point, of course, a great deal depends on who is doing the in-
terview, the questions asked, and the nominees’ responses). 
 It is possible that recognizing the large number of potential con-
siderations discourages academics from pondering the qualifications 
of ideal nominees to the Court and other Article III courts. Academ-
ics might view such an exercise as futile, for they appreciate that ju-
dicial nominees are not chosen in vacuums. Yet neither Senators nor 
academics hesitate to evaluate nominees, particularly those to the 
Supreme Court, on the basis of some criteria. The question thus re-
mains as to the appropriate criteria for measuring the quality of a 
particular nomination. Of course, the fact that a nomination falls 
short of an ideal is not necessarily an argument against it. Supreme 
Court nominees usually enter the confirmation phase with at least a 
presumption, or likelihood, that they will be confirmed.19 It thus usu-
ally takes some rather significant things—not just some deviation 
from an ideal—to put nominations in trouble. Nevertheless, the 
stronger nominees’ credentials (or the more closely they approxi-
mates an ideal), the tougher it may be to undermine their nomina-
tion. Thus, looking at another way to determine ideal credentials 
                                                                                                                     
 19. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Toward a Comprehensive Understanding of the Federal 
Appointments Process, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 467, 479-81 (1998). 
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might be fruitful for providing at least one significant measure for 
evaluating the relative strengths of particular nominations. 
2.   Determining Merit in Reverse 
 Part II.C.1, supra, examined possible judicial selection criteria on 
which there might be consensus. This section considers determining 
qualifications by looking at merit in reverse. It considers whether it 
is possible to infer from the Justices we might generally agree were 
“great” or “excellent” what they might have had in common prior to 
their appointments. The question is whether the signs of at least po-
tential “greatness” or “excellence” were evident at the times of the 
appointments of Justices who later proved themselves to be first-rate 
Justices.  
 I illustrate this tack through two examples. The first is Justice 
Benjamin Cardozo. His name appears on most lists of great Jus-
tices,20 so the question naturally arises whether, or in what ways, 
Justice Cardozo’s greatness or excellence was evident at the time of 
his nomination. Throughout his career—first as a lawyer specializing 
in appellate briefs (from 1891 to 1913), then as a judge (since 1914) 
and later chief judge (since 1926) of the New York Court of Appeals—
Cardozo, nominally a Democrat, had enjoyed the confidence of all po-
litical factions.21 Achieving this level of confidence was especially sig-
nificant because he had done it in an era when state courts (and his 
court especially) were widely revered. Cardozo was also the author of 
several highly regarded books and had received honorary degrees 
from many universities, including Yale, Columbia (his alma mater), 
and Harvard.22 Many of his decisions in such areas as torts and con-
tracts influenced judges and courts throughout the nation. Thus, he 
evidently had, by the time of his appointment, compiled ample judi-
cial experience, shown considerable legal acumen, and demonstrated 
excellent judicial temperament, collegiality, and leadership on a lead-
ing court. At the time of his appointment, Cardozo’s integrity and 
character were beyond reproach.  
 My second example involves another New Yorker, Charles Evans 
Hughes, whom many believe was a first-rate jurist (not once but 
twice!).23 When Hughes was first nominated and confirmed to the 
                                                                                                                     
 20. See, e.g., LEADERS OF THE PACK: POLLS & CASE STUDIES OF GREAT SUPREME 
COURT JUSTICES 10-12 (William D. Pederson & Norman W. Provizer eds., 2003) [hereinaf-
ter LEADERS]; Albert P. Blaustein & Roy M. Mersky, Rating Supreme Court Justices, 58 
A.B.A. J. 1183, 1183 (1972); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN 
REPUTATION (1990). 
 21. See ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO (1998) (detailing Cardozo’s legal career). 
 22. For a brief account of Cardozo’s legal training at Columbia, see id. at 40-50. 
 23. See LEADERS, supra note 20, at 187-88. 
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Supreme Court in 1910, he already had outstanding credentials.24 He 
had been an active practitioner with one of the leading law firms in 
the country, been a leader of the New York and national bars, and 
devoted himself to substantial public service. At the time President 
Taft appointed Hughes as an Associate Justice, Hughes was serving 
with distinction as the Governor of New York. As an Associate Jus-
tice, Hughes authored a number of significant opinions, demon-
strated respect for his colleagues and opposing arguments, and dis-
played an evenhanded temperament. After leaving the Court six 
years later to run unsuccessfully for President of the United States,25 
he served as president of the American Bar Association;26 argued 
several cases successfully before the Supreme Court (and performed 
significant pro bono work); served for four years as Secretary of State 
under Presidents Harding and Coolidge (1921-1925);27 and served on 
the Permanent Court of International Justice, or World Court (1928-
1929).28 Few nominees to the Court have ever matched Hughes’ re-
cord of public service prior to either of his appointments to the Court, 
and fewer had records of public service that commanded the respect 
of the leaders of both parties (though this did not save him from hav-
ing a significant minority of Senators vote against his nomination as 
Chief Justice for fear of his allegiance to big business29). Hughes 
brought statesmanship to the task of judging.  
 My point is not to suggest that either Cardozo or Hughes ought to 
be the ideal model of a Supreme Court Justice or Chief Justice. 
Rather, my point is that if we are sincerely interested in measuring 
merit, we might consider inferring from certain nominees’ records, 
during their respective appointments, appropriate criteria for meri-
torious appointments to the Court. But we rarely do. This may be be-
cause we rarely take merit into consideration without some reference 
to ideology. Many, if not most, of us might suspect that most Presi-
dents and Senators are preoccupied with ideology in assessing judi-
cial nominees. Consequently, we need to consider the implications of 
the linkage of merit to ideology in the federal judicial selection proc-
ess.  
                                                                                                                     
 24. See SAMUEL HENDEL, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES AND THE SUPREME COURT 1-15 
(1951). 
 25. See id. at 68-71. 
 26. 2 MERLO J. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 587 (1951). 
 27. HENDEL, supra note 24, at 74-77. 
 28. 2 PUSEY, supra note 26, at 640-47. 
 29. HENDEL, supra note 24, at 78-90 (discussing the debate over Hughes’s nomination 
to the position of Chief Justice). 
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D.   Assumptions on Which Few People Agree 
 A fourth way to define merit is through assumptions on which few 
people agree. It is possible that many, or even most, of us might 
agree that ideology is pertinent to judicial selection, though we might 
not agree on the particular ideology that we would prefer for judicial 
nominees to have.  
 Indeed, no one seriously thinks that President George W. Bush 
has been using the same criteria that President Clinton employed in 
choosing which people to nominate to district and circuit court judge-
ships. Instead, we strongly suspect (based on leaks and outcomes) 
that President Bush is considering different sets of people from those 
that President Clinton considered nominating as judges. The differ-
ences in their nominees go beyond party affiliations or allegiances; 
they reflect differences in experience, political commitments and ser-
vice, and attitudes about how to decide constitutional cases. These 
attitudes are what some people might call ideological commitments. 
 Yet it is reasonable to wonder whether there are any selection cri-
teria on which Presidents Bush and Clinton (or their respective ad-
visers) would agree. (Presidents Clinton and Bush apparently did 
agree on two nominees—Judges Roger Gregory and Barrington 
Parker, Jr.—whom they nominated and who were ultimately con-
firmed by the Republican-led Senate in 2001.30) Presidents Clinton 
and Bush (and their supporters and advisers) each have claimed that 
they nominated the best-qualified people as federal judges, but these 
claims beg the question: how do we determine merit, or who are the 
best-qualified people for judicial appointments? It is not immediately 
clear why or how both Presidents could be appointing the best-
qualified people given that they appear to have been nominating 
quite different kinds of people to judgeships—people with different 
backgrounds, political experience, party affiliations, sponsors, and 
attitudes. 
 Given these circumstances, a typical refrain from scholars is to in-
sist that ideology matters, because it frequently makes the critical 
difference in whom the President nominates or whom the Senate con-
firms to Article III courts, and thus we need to focus on the likely 
ideologies of judicial nominees in evaluating whether they ought to 
                                                                                                                     
 30. In his final year in office, President Clinton nominated Roger Gregory and Bar-
rington Parker, Jr., to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and for the Second 
Circuit, respectively. The Senate never acted on those nominations. Consequently, Presi-
dent Clinton in his last month in office designated both nominees as recess appointees to 
their respective courts of appeals. These appointments would have expired at the end of 
the next congressional session. However, in March of his first year in office, President 
George W. Bush announced his first set of nominees to the federal courts of appeals, in-
cluding Gregory to the Fourth Circuit and Parker to the Second Circuit. David G. Savage, 
Bush Picks 11 for Federal Bench, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 2001, at A1. 
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be confirmed. Walter Dellinger’s proposed solution to the impasse 
over some of President Bush’s judicial nominees has the distinct vir-
tue of smoking out whether ideology is what matters most to each 
side.31 He proposes that each President ought to agree to nominate at 
least one of a preselected few people approved by the opposition party 
in exchange for a relatively smooth confirmation process for every 
three or four people he prefers to appoint to a particular circuit court 
of appeals. For instance, in exchange for his getting Miguel Estrada, 
Bret Kavanaugh, and Tom Griffith appointed to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia,32 President Bush would be 
obliged to nominate someone from a group of potential nominees ap-
proved by the Democratic caucus in the Senate. If the President were 
to refuse, Dellinger argues, then it can only be because he clearly 
prefers to zealously protect his prerogative to take ideology into ac-
count in nominating judges.  
 Dellinger poses a powerful test of presidential commitment to 
ideological criteria for judicial nominations. Nevertheless, it is possi-
ble that Presidents may zealously protect their nominating authority 
(as did, for instance, Presidents Tyler and Madison in the nineteenth 
century33) for reasons other than the desire to ensure the ideological 
purity of their judicial nominations. Presidents may wish to preserve 
their autonomy to nominate people to judgeships for such other rea-
sons as rewarding personal or party fealty, currying the favor of par-
ticular Senators or constituencies, and broadening the diversity of 
the federal judiciary. Of course, none of these reasons for appoint-
ment is mutually exclusive from fulfilling certain ideological criteria. 
It is possible that Presidents, or at least their advisers, might define 
merit as an additional criterion for nomination or perhaps as the 
critical factor for choosing among potential nominees or for determin-
ing the potential sets of nominees for particular judgeships. Indeed, 
some Presidents, or their advisers, might define merit as including a 
particular ideological orientation with respect to constitutional inter-
pretation. It is not unprecedented by any means for Presidents to se-
lect people as nominees based on the extent to which the nominees 
conform to the presidents’ notions as to the duties they expect judges 
or Justices to perform. President Reagan, I suggested earlier, seems 
                                                                                                                     
 31. Walter Dellinger, Broaden the Slate, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2003, at A23. 
 32. Miguel Estrada, Bret Kavanaugh, and Thomas Griffith are three Bush nominees 
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia on which the Senate never acted. 
Democrats successfully blocked a floor vote on Estrada’s nomination, while the Judiciary 
Committee, as of the date of our Symposium, never acted on either Kavanaugh’s or Grif-
fith’s nomination. I do not know Estrada personally, but I do know both Kavanaugh and 
Griffith, both of whom very kindly and generously have given their time to visit, more than 
once, my constitutional law classes. 
 33. See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 53-55 (rev. ed. 
2003). 
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to have defined merit, at least in part, as including certain ideologi-
cal commitments.34 He insisted that his staff and Senators recom-
mend candidates for judicial nominations that fit particular criteria, 
including a rigid commitment to original understanding in all cases. 
Thus there are administrations that define merit in terms of ideol-
ogy. 
 The fact that administrations—and a number of commentators—
define merit in terms of, or in part based on, ideology leads some em-
pirical researchers to do the same. For instance, Segal and Spaeth 
measure the attitudes, or ideologies, of judges and Justices based on 
newspaper editorials at the time of their respective appointments,35 
while Lee Epstein and Gary King have suggested determining nomi-
nees’ ideologies based on the Senators sponsoring them.36 But Sena-
tors sponsor nominees for many different reasons, not the least of 
which is payback for political support or fealty. Some Senators also 
may not care about ideology or make assumptions about nominees’ 
ideologies based on what others tell them. Moreover, of course, as 
others have suggested, one of the nation’s most important appellate 
courts—the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia—is 
not within a state. The District of Columbia has no Senators, and 
thus senatorial courtesy does not work in the same way for its judges 
as it does for those from the fifty states. An additional complication is 
that some states do not have any Senators from the President’s 
party, in which case they have no input on nominations or the Presi-
dent pays more attention to what the highest elected official within 
the state from his party has to say about prospective nominations. In 
short, it is possible that sponsoring Senators signal nominees’ possi-
ble commitments to particular ideologies, if and only if the Senators 
are well known (and can be shown) to prefer nominees with such 
commitments.  
 Empiricists should also consider three other possible measures of 
ideology. The first is simply to look at how different organizations 
characterize nominees’ judicial attitudes. These definitions are 
unlikely to be neutral; they are as likely to be self-serving as the as-
sessments of any other parties with vested interests in the fates of 
particular judicial nominations. A second measure might be reflected 
in the nominees’ activities with organizations whose members are 
known to have or share particular attitudes about constitutional law. 
The problem with this standard is that it is unclear how many or 
even which activities demonstrate ideological commitments that will 
carry over into judging. Moreover, some nominees might not have 
                                                                                                                     
 34. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 35. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 7, at 204.  
 36. See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2002). 
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fixed attitudes about constitutional law generally or in particular 
fields. Third, researchers could identify which materials are perti-
nent for demonstrating nominees’ judicial attitudes and assess 
nominees’ attitudes on the basis of those materials. For instance, 
nominees’ speeches or law review articles might reflect certain ideo-
logical commitments. This might be especially pertinent for nominees 
to appellate courts, particularly the Supreme Court. Whereas district 
court judges are presumably bound by the opinions of the federal 
court of appeals within their respective circuit, appellate judges are 
bound by Supreme Court opinions, but less so, and sometimes not at 
all, by the opinions of other panels within their respective circuits. 
The extent to which judges may not be strictly tethered by precedent 
requires examining the various other bases on which they might 
ground their opinions. The problems with this approach are, how-
ever, that some nominees might not have produced any extrajudicial 
writings, some writings or speeches might not reveal much about ju-
dicial nominees’ attitudes, and the nominees can credibly argue that 
the speeches or articles are irrelevant because scholars and judges 
are not subject to the same constraints. Scholars are free to analyze 
legal questions on the basis of whatever sources they consider to be 
appropriate, while judges, even appellate ones, are not. The latter 
are duty-bound to assess legal questions on the basis of a relatively 
narrow range of materials, including precedent.  
 It is possible that measuring merit is complicated by yet one more 
factor: We have no consensus on whose opinion ought to matter in 
evaluating merit. Law professors, practitioners, and even other 
judges may have special insights into what jurists do, but there is 
good reason to think that none of these groups are perfectly neutral. 
Each group qualifies as an external source of authority on merit, but 
each group’s members may only employ the conceptions of merit in 
which they have vested interests, with each gravitating toward the 
judges and Justices with whose opinions they tend to agree.  
 None of the deficiencies of particular definitions of merit, however, 
make empirical studies of judicial performance and selection impos-
sible. We need not settle on a normative conception of merit on which 
everyone in the world can agree. What we need are normative crite-
ria that are at least coherent, credible, and comprehensive. The next 
Part examines the missing element in most empirical research on ju-
dicial selection that precludes it from being as comprehensive and 
precise as it ought to be.   
III.   THE BATTLE OVER THE MAINSTREAM IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
 The reasons for the attraction, or dominance, of ideology in judi-
cial selection are obvious. First, national political leaders care about 
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ideology because of the high stakes involved in judicial appoint-
ments. They understand that Article III judges enjoy life tenure and 
thus are immune from political retaliation against their decisions. 
Judicial opinions on constitutional law cannot be overturned through 
ordinary legislation but only through the extraordinary means of re-
versal by constitutional amendment or by a superior court (for fed-
eral district and appellate courts) or by the Supreme Court (for its 
own opinions). Consequently, national political leaders devote a good 
deal of time trying to ensure that the people appointed as judges and 
Justices will exercise power in ways that are satisfactory to them. 
 Second, national political leaders have almost no incentive to 
reach any consensus on merit. Most citizens pay little or no attention 
to lower court appointments, so leaders can expect little or no public 
backlash to their decisions on lower court appointments. Moreover, 
Presidents and Senators are reluctant to relinquish their institu-
tional prerogatives in the selection process. If they ever do so, it is 
only in exchange for something else that they have decided is more 
important to them (at least for the moment). Presidents and Senators 
might sometimes have incentives to reach accommodations, but ac-
commodations are much harder to come by for Presidents and Sena-
tors from the opposition party. Presidents from one party and Sena-
tors from the other often need conflict to sharpen the differences be-
tween them and to call attention to the stakes involved in the selec-
tion process. Bipartisan agreement on a general definition of merit 
would merely reduce, rather than preserve or expand, Senators’ dis-
cretion in subsequent confirmation proceedings. It would tie Sena-
tors’ hands in specific confirmation contests. Merit gets attention 
when there is a political advantage in addressing it.   
 The most intense confirmation contests between Republicans and 
Democrats focus not on merit but rather on the contours of the main-
stream in constitutional law. Each side claims that its nominees are 
in the mainstream and that the other side’s contested nominees are 
outside it. For instance, Senators opposed to the Bork nomination ar-
gued that he was outside the mainstream of constitutional law, while 
his defenders argued that his scholarship and thinking was well 
within it.37 More recently, Democrats have supported six filibusters 
against judicial nominees whose views on constitutional issues are, 
in the Democrats’ judgment, outside of the mainstream. The defend-
ers have argued that just the opposite is true.38 
                                                                                                                     
 37. See generally ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: HOW THE BORK NOMINATION 
SHOOK AMERICA (1989). 
 38. See Neil A. Lewis, G.O.P. Seeks to Ease Rules on Filibusters of Judgeships, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 10, 2003, at A15. 
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 The contest to define the mainstream has not just been rhetorical. 
A good deal is at stake. Each side desperately wants its nominees to 
be viewed as occupying the middle, rather than the extreme end or 
outside, of the spectrum in constitutional law. The middle is the saf-
est, strongest ground. Moreover, opposing nominees, because they 
are outside the mainstream, puts the other side on the defensive. 
More important, each side appreciates the enormous stakes involved, 
for with each victory each side advances one step further in building 
a foundation for an enduring constitutional vision. The vision is im-
portant in guiding not just other judicial nominations but also the 
exercise of presidential and legislative authority. The prize is shap-
ing constitutional law for as far into the future as possible. 
 While it is not hard to understand why political leaders care in-
tensely about securing the mainstream—or the middle—in constitu-
tional law, it is harder for someone outside of (or not invested in) the 
process to determine what counts as the middle. While this determi-
nation would be useful for analyzing the claims of the opposing sides 
in defining the mainstream, I consider in Part III.A some of the diffi-
culties with determining the mainstream in constitutional law. With 
these difficulties in mind, I then propose ways in which we might 
figure out the mainstream, or the middle, in constitutional law. 
A.   Problems with Defining the Middle in Constitutional Law 
 There are several major problems with identifying the middle 
ground in contemporary constitutional law. First, empirical analysis 
cannot easily capture what counts as the middle because the choices 
of what to emphasize or count are value-laden. Anyone looking to de-
fine the middle, or the mainstream (and the two are not necessarily 
the same), in constitutional law must make judgments about rele-
vance: Are all cases relevant? Should we only look at the judgments 
or outcomes in particular cases, or should we also look at the reason-
ing (including its quality and extent)? Where, for instance, do seem-
ingly obvious cases like Roe v. Wade,39 Lawrence v. Texas,40 and Lee v. 
Weisman41 fit? Some might argue that they are clearly on the “left” in 
constitutional law, but others might argue that they are consistent 
with a libertarian perspective on the “right.” Arguing that one or the 
other of these positions is correct is just another value judgment.  
 Second, an even more serious problem with defining the middle or 
the mainstream in constitutional law is that neither the categories 
we employ in assessing judicial performance nor many nominees’ 
constitutional views are fixed. Because of the phenomenon of ideo-
                                                                                                                     
 39. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 40. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 41. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
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logical drift, categories are not static; particular perspectives on con-
stitutional law associated with particular political factions may over 
time be appropriated by or become associated with different political 
factions.42 For instance, Chief Justice John Marshall reflected a “con-
servative” rather than a “liberal” perspective on constitutional law, 
because he usually favored the status quo. His successor as Chief 
Justice of the United States, Roger Taney, was understood, at the 
time of his appointment, as representing a “liberal” perspective on 
constitutional law because he was thought to favor progressive legis-
lation and reform of the status quo.43 It is only because of ideological 
drift that each is now viewed differently.44 New Deal liberals found 
they had a lot in common with the opinions of Chief Justice Mar-
shall, because of their consistent support for a strong national gov-
ernment; and conservatives admired Taney’s ardent efforts to resist 
the expansion of the national government at the expense of state 
sovereignty.  
 The labels “liberal” and “conservative” do not fit contemporary 
Justices much better. For instance, Justice John Paul Stevens, ap-
pointed to the Court in 1976 by President Ford, is frequently de-
scribed as a “liberal” by commentators and critics.45 Yet he hardly 
seems to have much in common with other “liberals” such as Associ-
ate Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall, with whom he 
sat for many years. Nor does it seem appropriate to describe Justices 
Kennedy and O’Connor as strictly “conservative” simply because they 
have often favored protecting state sovereignty in Commerce Clause46 
and Eleventh Amendment cases.47 They also have voted to reaffirm 
the embattled decision of Roe v. Wade,48 to strike down antisodomy 
laws in Lawrence v. Texas,49 and to strike down the Virginia Military 
                                                                                                                     
 42. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Rhetoric of Judicial Critique: From Judicial Re-
straint to the Virtual Bill of Rights, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 585, 637-38 (2002). 
 43. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Lives of John Marshall, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1399 (2002). 
 44. See id. 
 45. See, e.g., Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 2001 Term, 30 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 307, 311, passim (2003); Youngsik Lim, An Empirical Analysis of 
Supreme Court Justices’ Decision Making, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 721, 737 (2000). 
 46. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (majority opinion of Rehnquist, 
C.J., joined by O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ.); United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549, 568-83 (1995). 
 47. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (majority opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by 
Rehnquist, C.J., and O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ.); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 
517 U.S. 44 (1996) (majority opinion of Rehnquist, C.J., joined by O’Connor, Scalia, Ken-
nedy, and Thomas, JJ.). 
 48. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, 
and Souter, JJ.). 
 49. 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (majority opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Stevens, Souter, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.); id. at 579-85 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).  
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Institute’s policy to exclude women.50 It is conceivably more accurate 
to describe Justices Kennedy and O’Connor as moderates, though 
many Senators would resist doing so because it would cede the mid-
dle ground to these Justices rather than to others they might prefer 
to place there. 
 A third problem with fixing the middle ground in constitutional 
law is that Justices and judges sometimes shift their attitudes about 
constitutional law either generally or in particular cases. Justice 
Harry Blackmun is often described as evolving, or growing, over time 
into a more “liberal” justice.51 Others might move in the other direc-
tion. Segal and Spaeth claim, inter alia, that Justices Stevens and 
Souter each became more “liberal” over time, while Justice White be-
came more “conservative” over time.52 As Chief Justice, William 
Rehnquist has sometimes been said to have moderated some views,53 
as he arguably did in writing the Court’s opinions reaffirming 
Miranda v. Arizona,54 concurring in United States v. Virginia,55 and 
upholding the Family Leave Act as an exercise of Congress’s author-
ity pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment in Ne-
vada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs.56  
 Some people seem to assume that most nominees have ideological 
precommitments at the times of their nominations that are impervi-
ous to change, but it is impossible to prove that this is true, espe-
cially when the nominees themselves disclaim holding any such 
commitments. 
 Fourth, legal academics have done little to illuminate what may 
fall inside or outside the mainstream of constitutional law. Most le-
gal scholars appear interested less in finding common ground than in 
delivering the knock-out punch against opposing points of view.57 A 
common goal of legal scholarship is paradigm-shifting, but in pursu-
ing this goal, legal scholars will dismiss as wrong or dangerous 
points of view affiliated with the paradigm they are trying to undo. 
The pursuit of this goal is not likely to enrich our understanding of 
                                                                                                                     
 50. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (majority opinion of Ginsburg, J., 
joined by Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer, JJ.). 
 51. See, e.g., BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 316 (1993). 
 52. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 7, at 218. 
 53. A number of suggestions have been made as to why Chief Justice Rehnquist 
seems to have moderated some views. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, Foreword: From Miranda to 
§ 3501 to Dickerson to . . ., 99 MICH. L. REV. 879, 889-92 (2001). 
 54. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (upholding Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). 
 55. 518 U.S. at 558-66 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment). 
 56. 538 U.S. 721 (2003). 
 57. Cf. Suzanna Sherry, Too Clever by Half: The Problem with Novelty in Constitu-
tional Law, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 921 (2001) (noting that in many scholarly discussions of the 
counter-majoritarian difficulty, “grandtheory” tends to dominate over simpler and more 
coherent arguments). 
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which views actually do, rather than ought to, fall within the main-
stream of American constitutional law. 
 Fifth, the media hinders sophisticated discussions of judicial per-
formance. The media has begun to shirk its traditional role in edu-
cating the public. It has moved from reporting “hard” news, or facts 
and figures, to reporting “soft” news, or speculation and commen-
tary.58 The proliferation of media outlets and twenty-four-hour news 
has put enormous pressure on newspapers and television reporters to 
emphasize scandal. The media prefers drama and conflict, because it 
gets people’s attention. As candidates and commentators increasingly 
feel the need to characterize opponents in extreme terms, the media 
follows suit. Candidates are thus “liberal” or “conservative,” and Jus-
tices are also one or the other. No one, apparently, begins as a mod-
erate or ends up as one. From the perspective of the media, the mid-
dle in politics is nothing more than the otherwise unoccupied ground 
that the candidates fight to control, while the media simply covers 
the flashier portions of the fight. 
B.   Sketching the Middle 
 Assessing judicial ideologies is difficult without having some 
yardstick with which to measure them. One cannot talk about ex-
treme views, or views falling outside of the mainstream, without 
clarifying which views are not extreme, or do not fall outside the 
mainstream. It is possible that the measurement of an ideology is a 
purely normative matter, depending on its appeal to lawmakers and 
its consistency with constitutional law as they understand it. Even 
then we need to define the middle, or moderation, as a means of 
curbing reckless or misleading rhetoric. We need our rhetoric to fit 
the complicated business of judging. So the question is how accu-
rately can we describe a middle course or the contours of the main-
stream in constitutional law.  
 I offer a few possible answers, with each of the difficulties de-
scribed above in mind. First, we can identify the middle ground as 
that which each of the contending sides in confirmation contests is 
trying desperately to occupy. We can define it, in other words, as an 
aspiration. We can assess nominees based on how well they fit the 
description of the middle ground, or mainstream, of their supporters. 
One problem with this definition is that it might allow one side to de-
fine the terms on which it prefers for its nominees to be assessed, 
without any second-guessing; however, this understanding of the 
mainstream puts pressure on supporters of particular nominations to 
                                                                                                                     
 58. See Hess, supra note 9. 
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be careful about how they characterize nominees or risk having the 
latter fail to meet expectations.  
 Second, we could define the mainstream as comprised of the pool 
of people who successfully made it through the judicial nomination 
process. They constitute a large and diverse pool, which reflects the 
approval of the governing elite. The problem with this understanding 
of the mainstream is that it fails to take into account the fact that 
many people make it through the process without close scrutiny. 
Many of the people confirmed also might not have had fixed views at 
the time of their appointments or might change their views over 
time. In addition, it is not clear why we should ever define the main-
stream based on what judges and Justices actually do, because they 
act independent from the governing elite once they are confirmed. 
Indeed, most judges and Justices serve long after the political coali-
tion or majorities who chose the people responsible for their ap-
pointments have ceased to exist. For instance, John Marshall served 
most of his long tenure as Chief Justice long after the demise of the 
Federalist party with which he had been associated.  
 Moreover, defining the mainstream as those whom the Senate has 
confirmed merely gives each side an incentive to push the envelope. 
With each victory in the confirmation process, each party has ex-
panded the possibilities for its nominees. Once people are confirmed, 
their parties can point to them as examples, or precedents, to guide 
future confirmation proceedings.  
 A more interesting but speculative test might be to ask whether 
the President would still nominate or the Senate still approve the 
same judge if they knew what kinds of decisions the judges would 
make. In many cases, nominees are relatively blank slates, and, in 
any event, judges and Justices presumably fulfill special obligations 
independent from presidential and senatorial influence. So it might 
not be fair to attribute to Presidents and Senators all the decisions 
made by the judges and Justices they have approved.  
 Third, the mainstream could be understood as simply consisting of 
the views of those at the center of the Court. These days that would 
presumably be Justice O’Connor, because she rarely dissented in the 
2003 Term.59 The problem is that she did not decide these cases 
alone, and it is unclear why those with whom she joined in majority 
opinions ought to be excluded from the mainstream. Moreover, the 
center can shift, and there is no guarantee that Justice O’Connor will 
be there as often next year. Nor is it clear why dissenters ought to be 
excluded entirely, because dissents sometimes later become the law. 
                                                                                                                     
 59. See Linda Greenhouse, In a Momentous Term, Justices Remake the Law, and the 
Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2003, at A1. 
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 The fourth and final possibility is to define the mainstream as 
something more dynamic and broader than a specific Court or spe-
cific Justice at a particular moment in time. The Court is not alone in 
making constitutional law. Our political leaders make a great deal of 
constitutional law, much of which eludes judicial review.60 Moreover, 
the Court approves the vast majority of the constitutional decisions 
that it does review. It would also be wrong to assume that every Su-
preme Court decision reflects mainstream constitutional values. 
Sometimes the Court gets it wrong, as it did in Chisholm v. Geor-
gia,61 Dred Scott v. Sandford,62 and Korematsu v. United States.63 The 
constitutional views of Presidents and Senators are relevant to the 
makeup of the mainstream, because they have the power to try to 
move the Court in different directions (or perhaps keep it on course) 
by virtue of their respective authorities in the appointments process. 
They also have the power to shape the size, direction, and priorities 
of the federal government. Moreover, Presidents and members of 
Congress perform critical roles in approving enduring constitutional 
changes and in settling constitutional crises—failures within the 
Constitution to provide solutions to certain kinds of disputes.64 Con-
sequently, it is possible to define the mainstream as the dominant 
doctrine, outlook, and thinking on constitutional law in a given pe-
riod. The Court provides formal doctrine, the courts and national and 
state political leaders shape the constitutional outlook of a particular 
era, and all of these along with constitutional commentators and his-
torians (in a wide variety of fora) provide critical thinking on consti-
tutional law. This perspective on the mainstream has the virtue of 
encapsulating the constitutional activities of a given era. Its problem 
is that there is no method on which all people could agree for deter-
mining the relevant doctrine, outlook, and thinking of a particular 
era. Historians might be in the best position to pull this information 
together, but only in retrospective. It is a challenge, to say the least, 
for someone to step outside of his or her own time to develop a credi-
ble perspective on it. Time does not stand still for any person or any 
thing, and none of the things that we might think are essential for 
shaping the mainstream—doctrine, outlook, and critical thought—
are purely static. 
                                                                                                                     
 60. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitution Outside the Courts, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 
775 (2003). 
 61. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
 62. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
 63. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 64. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Crisis and Constitutionalism, 63 MONT. L. REV. 277 
(2002). 
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IV.   PROVING (HOW MUCH) IDEOLOGY MATTERS 
 Proving that ideology is a dominant factor in the judicial selection 
process—as many people suppose—is no small feat. There are a 
number of complications with determining the extent to which ideol-
ogy was a major factor or the primary basis for the President’s nomi-
nation and the Senate’s confirmation of various judicial nominees. 
Below, I first review these problems and then offer some modest sug-
gestions for future empirical analysis on the significance of ideology 
in the judicial selection process.  
A.   Fixing Ideology 
 There are a number of problems with proving empirically whether 
and, if so, how much ideology was a factor in the nominating or con-
firmation phase. To be sure, this is a question that social scientists 
have spent considerable time and effort trying to answer.65 Neverthe-
less, several problems persist. First, reaching consensus on what 
qualifies as ideology is difficult. While I personally understand ideol-
ogy as a precommitment to certain constitutional values or to resolv-
ing particular questions of constitutional law, regardless of the facts 
of particular cases, this is but one understanding.66 Indeed, people 
widely disagree over how to define ideology and even whether Presi-
dents and Senators have taken ideology into account in the appoint-
ments process. Consequently, one difficulty with proving that ideol-
ogy matters in the selection process is adopting a credible definition 
of ideology. 
 The second problem is that it is a mistake to assume that every 
judicial nominee has a well-conceived or thoroughly worked-out con-
stitutional ideology. It is possible that many, even most, do, but judi-
cial nominees often publicly disavow commitment to a particular 
constitutional ideology. Moreover, ideology presumably functions as a 
blinding mechanism, so that it is conceivable that some nominees 
may not be aware that they have certain ideological commitments.  
 Third, and perhaps most important, the relevance of ideology to 
particular judges’ decisions or to particular confirmation decisions 
may not be evident in the public record. If the President and his 
nominees deny that the latter have particular ideological commit-
ments, then the burden shifts to the other side to prove them wrong. 
                                                                                                                     
 65. See, e.g., Charles M. Cameron et al., Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees: A 
Neoinstitutional Model, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 525 (1990); Jeffrey Segal, Senate Confirma-
tion of Supreme Court Justices: Partisan and Institutional Politics, 49 J. POL. 998 (1987); 
Jeffrey A. Segal et al., The Role of Ideology in Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Jus-
tices, 77 KY. L.J. 485 (1988-89); Donald R. Songer, The Relevance of Policy Values for the 
Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominees, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 927 (1979). 
 66. See, e.g., David W. Minar, Ideology and Political Behavior, 5 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 
317 (1961) (noting different conceptions and definitions of ideology). 
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This is precisely the dynamic with President Bush’s judicial nomina-
tions. He has publicly defended his nominations on the ground of 
merit, and he has disavowed that he has employed a litmus test or 
chosen nominees based on particular ideological commitments.67 His 
nominees also publicly disavow such commitments.68 Consequently, 
skeptical Democrats must infer his selection criteria—including any 
preference for ideological precommitments—from the kinds of nomi-
nees that he has chosen.  
 Moreover, most judicial nominations do not fail because the Sen-
ate formally rejects them. They fail because of inaction. Senate rules 
provide that a nomination lapses unless the Senate has acted on it 
before the end of the current legislative session, and if they do not, 
the nominations fail. For instance, in President Clinton’s final year 
in office the Senate failed to act on more than sixty of his judicial 
nominations.69 There is little or no record on these nominees, so it is 
not possible to prove precisely why the Judiciary Committee did not 
hold hearings or votes on these nominees. The official record is silent 
on why these nominations failed. 
 To complicate matters further, the Senate debates that do occur 
over nominees rarely employ the term “ideology.” More often than 
not, the focus in confirmation contests has been on such matters as 
the nominee’s integrity, experience, competence, and temperament.70 
When the debates do shift focus to nominees’ commitments to (or ex-
pression of) particular constitutional views, they feature discussions 
about whether the nominee comes from the “mainstream” of consti-
tutional law. 
 Fourth, proving that ideology significantly matters to the fates of 
judicial nominations is complicated by the fact that Presidents and 
Senators rarely base their decisions in the appointments process on a 
single factor. Presidents, or their counselors, usually employ a range 
of criteria for making decisions on whom to nominate.71 In the Sen-
ate, a single factor is not necessarily determinative. It is possible 
that Senators might initially be disposed against particular nomina-
tions for one or two basic reasons, but their public opposition may not 
necessarily be predicated on these. Nor is it unusual for Presidents 
and Senators to base public decisions on factors they do not disclose. 
                                                                                                                     
 67. Adam Nagourney & Robin Toner, In Final Debate, Clashes on Taxes and Health 
Care, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2004, at A1. 
 68. See, e.g., Charles Lane, Lawmakers Press Nominee, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2002, at 
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 69. See Peter Hardin, Bush Rescinds Offer to Gregory; Remains Eligible for Federal 
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 70. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Divided Justice: A Commentary on the Nomination and 
Confirmation of Justice Thomas, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 969 (1992). 
 71. See generally ABRAHAM, supra note 4. 
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It is not incumbent upon our national leaders to disclose all the 
grounds for their constitutional decisions.  
 Moreover, Presidents and Senators must make different kinds of 
decisions in the selection process. Because Presidents are responsible 
for choosing nominees, they can make decisions about which persons 
they think are best qualified or best fit their selection criteria. Sena-
tors use a different calculus. While they are often able to provide in-
put (and even make specific recommendations) on nominations, their 
primary responsibility is to determine, not necessarily whether the 
nominee is ideal or the best qualified, but rather whether the nomi-
nee is acceptable according to whatever criteria each Senator decides 
is relevant. It is thus not unthinkable that 100 different Senators 
may use 100 different sets of criteria for evaluating judicial nomi-
nees. 
B.   How to Show Ideology Matters 
 The aforementioned problems are not necessarily fatal to the en-
terprise of proving that ideology makes a difference to outcomes in 
the confirmation process. Patterns invariably emerge within the pro-
cess. For instance, the Senate usually (but not always) approves the 
vast majority of a President’s judicial nominations. One could thus 
try to identify what successful nominees have in common or what 
traits or characteristics are shared by unsuccessful nominees. These 
are not necessarily easy ventures, but they are not impossible. For 
instance, social scientists, including David Yalof, have shown what 
they regard as the characteristics that the people nominated to the 
Supreme Court over the past few decades have had in common.72 
 Once one sets out to demonstrate the particular significance of a 
single factor, such as ideology, the task becomes somewhat more 
complicated. To make this showing, one needs to first determine the 
relevant independent and dependent variables.73 The variable that is 
to be explained—in the case of the confirmation process, the vote 
share (or how Senators voted on particular nominations) or the ab-
sence of a vote on a particular nomination—is the dependent vari-
able; it “depends,” or turns, on other variables. The latter are what 
social scientists call independent or “explanatory” variables, because 
they help to explain the dependent variable. The independent or ex-
planatory variables are not themselves explained by the theory one is 
trying to prove; they simply do the explaining. The effects of these 
variables are called coefficients. Mapping the coefficients on graphs 
                                                                                                                     
 72. DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND THE 
SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES (1999); see also Epstein et al., supra note 1. 
 73. For an excellent primer on statistical analysis, see RAY C. FAIR, PREDICTING 
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(to determine the points at which the variables intercept) and testing 
the coefficients are relatively sophisticated steps, which must be 
done in statistical analysis. But my point here is to clarify that, as an 
empirical matter, ideology is not the outcome that needs to be 
proved; instead, it is one of numerous variables that determine out-
comes in the confirmation process. Thus, we need to determine the 
relative impacts of ideology and other independent variables in the 
confirmation process.  
1.   Proving Judicial Ideology 
 One cannot prove that ideology matters without initially deter-
mining how ideology manifests itself. Presumably, it must reflect 
some commitment to a particular approach to constitutional inter-
pretation, regardless of the facts of particular cases. So the challenge 
for an empiricist is to track down and assess the intensity of a nomi-
nee’s expressions of any such ideological commitments. As I have 
suggested, a common approach among social scientists is to find 
these expressions by means of external indicators such as newspaper 
editorials and sponsoring Senators, even though these indicators 
may not all be reliable or credible. These indicators are by no means 
the only ones. Indeed, I suggest almost a dozen possible indicators of 
nominees’ ideological commitments, each of which can be empirically 
measured. 
 First, if the nominees are judges, one can inspect their opinions. 
Opinions merit special attention because judges speak through them. 
They have enormous potential to reveal what, if any, ideological 
commitments are at work. If opinions contain judges’ explicit ac-
knowledgments of ideological commitments, they ought to be given 
special weight, particularly because judges are not obliged to make 
such acknowledgments in constitutional adjudication. If opinions in-
stead reflect patterns of decisionmaking, then these too merit special 
consideration. This is especially true if the patterns relate to meth-
odology or prioritization of sources of decision.  
 Second, nominees’ writings and speeches might illuminate their 
ideological commitments. These materials are important, to some de-
gree, because some people are nominated in part because of the views 
expressed within them. Their writings and speeches are important, 
in other words, because they attracted attention from the right peo-
ple. If nominees’ writings and speeches contain the nominees’ admis-
sions of certain ideological commitments, they merit special weight. 
If they do not, then patterns in methodology or prioritization of 
sources could become relevant, especially if they are nearly or abso-
lutely uniform.  
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 Alternatively, one could merely award a number to a nominee, 
which would be based on the number of his or her extrajudicial writ-
ings on controversial subjects. The actual content of these writings 
may be less important than the number, because it is possible (and 
thus one would need to show) that the larger the number of writings 
on controversial subjects, the more a nominee has opened himself or 
herself to attack for his or her views on those subjects. (It is, of 
course, also possible that nominees can make controversial state-
ments about relatively mundane topics.) Thus, especially prolific con-
stitutional scholars would likely receive very high numbers, which 
could be negatively weighted because of the likelihood that some 
Senators will try to use their writings against them.  
 Fourth, other possible indicators of ideological commitments may 
be nominees’ professional activities. Some activities are more reveal-
ing than others. For example, someone who has dedicated a great 
deal of time to opposing the death penalty as unconstitutional is 
likely to have a settled view on the matter. It is, however, possible for 
some nominees to argue that their professional activities were 
merely undertaken at the bidding of their superiors or clients. Thus 
an empiricist needs to carefully screen nominees’ professional activi-
ties. The more they fall into controversial areas, the more negative 
weight they can be given in the confirmation process.  
 Fifth, one might ask which groups support particular nominees 
and on what bases. Groups no doubt might have different reasons to 
support different nominees, but some groups may be well known for 
preferring nominees with certain kinds of ideological commitments. 
The preferences of the latter group might be particularly relevant, 
especially if the group has identified the grounds for its approval of 
the nomination.  
 Sixth, one could measure which groups are opposing which nomi-
nees and the grounds for their opposition. Of particular interest will 
be the ones charging unacceptable ideological commitments. The 
more groups that do this, the more likely Senators will know about 
their opinion.  
 Alternatively, one could simply measure the numbers of witnesses 
testifying for and against particular nominations. While this data is 
obviously not available for nominees who never receive hearings, it 
could be very useful for illuminating the dynamic within particular 
confirmation contests. The larger the number of witnesses testifying, 
the more likely it is to be significant. There must be a reason why 
one nomination draws more witnesses than another. That reason 
may or may not have anything to do with ideological commitments, 
but it does bear on the nominee’s likely fate. So an empiricist needs 
to determine the grounds on which witnesses testify for and against 
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particular nominations, which can then be factored into his or her 
analysis.  
 Seventh, one could consult an administration’s selection criteria. 
Through their nominating authority, Presidents are able to set the 
terms of debate in the confirmation process. If nominees are not pre-
sented based on their ideologies, the burden shifts to the other side, 
and in practice it is hard for Senators on the defensive in the confir-
mation process to direct its results.  
 Eighth, empiricists ought to consider measuring the amount of 
time devoted in hearings to discussing nominees’ ideologies. This re-
quires counting not only the number of Senators’ statements and 
questions pertaining to ideology but also how much time nominees 
spend defending their judicial philosophies or explaining their sup-
posed ideologies. It is hard to dismiss a large amount of attention as 
nothing more than pretext. Even if it were, it shows the particular 
role played by ideology in particular hearings.  
 A related empirical inquiry could be undertaken to simply meas-
ure how much time nominees spend defending themselves against 
charges in their confirmation hearings. A rule of thumb in confirma-
tion hearings is that the more time nominees spend testifying before 
the Judiciary Committee (the “Committee”) the worse their chances 
of confirmation become. This is not because they are bad witnesses, 
though they may be. The concern, however, is that the longer the 
nominee is required to testify, the more likely there is something 
problematic about the nominee. Once these figures are determined, 
they could be grouped according to the reasons for extended testi-
mony. 
 Ninth, people who are not judges, even if they are academics, can 
credibly claim that their public musings do not reflect what they 
would do as judges because their duties as judges would require 
them to abide by certain norms, such as following precedent, that 
they are not bound to as scholars or commentators. These disclaim-
ers are made under oath and thus need to be factored into empirical 
analysis as well, for they shift the burden to the opposition not just to 
disprove them but also to suggest the nominees lied under oath. 
 Tenth, a final measure of ideological commitments may come from 
the testimony of those who claim to know the nominees best. What, 
in other words, do the people who claim to have read the nominees’ 
writings or opinions claim about the nominees’ ideological commit-
ments? This may not be entirely reliable, because many of the people 
contacting or testifying before the Committee may have vested inter-
ests in the outcomes of the hearings. To avoid the latter problem, it 
might be useful to examine whether these people are testifying 
against their nominal parties’ interests. For instance, Michael 
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McConnell benefited from having a number of prominent Democrats 
urge the Committee to approve his nomination, even though some 
Democratic Senators were disposed to be against it.74 While McCon-
nell had produced a relatively high number of extrajudicial writings 
on quite controversial subjects, that number could be reduced, or 
counterbalanced, by a different number based on the size of the 
group urging his confirmation against their own party’s supposed in-
terest. 
 Last but not least, empiricists ought to consider examining all 
failed nominations in order to determine what traits, if any, they had 
in common. It is possible that they all, or most of them, attracted op-
position based explicitly on ideological concerns. But they also might 
have attracted opposition because of a confluence of several of the 
other factors that are discussed infra in Parts IV.B.2 through 
IV.B.10. 
2.   Senate Composition 
 Confirmation proceedings do not occur in a vacuum. Among the 
other factors likely to have an impact on their outcomes is the Sen-
ate’s composition. Presidents often take the composition of the Sen-
ate into account in deciding whom to nominate and when. The repre-
sentative strength of a President’s political party in the Senate is ob-
viously important, because it determines which parties control the 
Judiciary Committee, the agenda on the floor of the Senate, and the 
length of debate. If the minority party controls at least forty seats in 
the Senate, it can then block some judicial nominations by filibuster-
ing them.75 Threatening filibusters or temporary holds (which are, in 
effect, mini-filibusters) can sometimes influence whether and when 
Presidents make certain nominations.  
 The Senate composition can thus influence how quickly and even 
how many nominations get through to the Senate floor for final 
votes. If the opposing party controls the Senate, it raises the likeli-
hood of obstruction of at least some judicial nominations. Hence if the 
President’s party does not control the Senate, this number is likely to 
be a negative coefficient. If, however, the President’s party does con-
trol the Senate, it is likely to be a positive one, and quite large if the 
President’s party controls more than sixty seats. If the President’s 
party controls a majority but less than sixty seats, it still merits a 
positive coefficient, though the possibility of filibuster merits making 
it not a very high one. 
                                                                                                                     
 74. See Jan Crawford Greenburg, Critic of Roe vs. Wade in Judiciary Hot Seat, CHI. 
TRIB., Sept. 19, 2002, at 15. 
 75. See Standing Rules of the Senate, S. DOC. NO. 106-15, R. XXII (2000), available at 
http://www.rules.senate.gov/senaterules/rule22.htm. 
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3.   Timing 
 Another factor that can potentially influence confirmation out-
comes is timing. Election years tend not to be good times for Presi-
dents to make judicial nominations, particularly to the Supreme 
Court. In the nineteenth century, the Senate did not act on at least 
nine Supreme Court nominations, supposedly because the majority 
party was trying to keep the vacancies open until after the next 
presidential election.76 In President Clinton’s final year in office, the 
Senate did not act on more than sixty of his judicial nominations.77 
Similarly, the Democratic-led Senate did not act on dozens of the 
first President Bush’s judicial nominations in his final year in office, 
presumably because of a desire to reserve as many judicial vacancies 
as possible for the next President.78 
 Timing might matter in a different way. Most failed nominations 
do not get so far as receiving Committee votes; they fail, as I have 
suggested, because of inaction. Moreover, not all nominations that 
get hearings are scheduled for Committee votes. Consequently, one 
needs to figure out how long a nomination has gone without a hear-
ing or whether it has gotten a Committee vote within a certain period 
of time (presumably the average length of a time between a nomina-
tion and a Committee vote). Those nominations exceeding the aver-
age length of time without yet getting a hearing or Committee vote 
will likely not be approved. Moreover, the closer a nomination comes 
to being made near the end of a legislative session, the less delay is 
needed to nullify it.  
 Consequently, timing can be quantified in at least three ways, 
each negatively. The first is the extent to which it exceeds the aver-
age length of time for confirmation; the second is whether the nomi-
nations have been made in an election year; and the third is the ex-
tent to which a nomination was made with less time left in a session 
than the average amount of time needed for confirmation.  
4.   Sponsoring Senators 
 Sponsoring Senators may make a difference to the fates of at least 
some judicial nominees. The more powerful the Senator, the more 
likely one might expect nominees he has supported to be confirmed. 
For instance, the Senate has confirmed almost a half-dozen nominees 
who at one time or another worked for Senator Orrin Hatch, the for-
mer Chair of the Judiciary Committee.79 Indeed, Senator Hatch con-
vinced President Clinton to nominate a former aide to a district court 
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in Utah, after he had held up every other judicial nomination pend-
ing President Clinton’s compliance.80  
5.   Presidential Popularity 
 It is possible that a President’s popularity might have an effect on 
a nomination’s fate. By popularity, I mean the President’s political 
strength as reflected in, inter alia, his approval ratings with the pub-
lic. These might show the risks involved in a fight with the Presi-
dent. The more closely a nomination is identified with the President 
(or the more it means to him) or his policies, the more likely that the 
popularity of the President or his policies will be an important factor. 
The more popular the President or the policies with which the nomi-
nee is associated, the greater likelihood this popularity will benefit 
his nomination. The more political coinage that a President has on 
which to draw from in confirmation contests, the more likely Sena-
tors will suffer some political damage or loss from such confronta-
tions. Some Senators might choose contests over some judicial nomi-
nations because they believe the conflicts can improve their standing 
with important constituencies or can underscore their own political 
commitments. But contests are not likely to be completely cost-free, 
particularly insofar as Presidents remember them and have the 
means and opportunity to seek retaliation.   
 A related factor may be party cohesion or fidelity. The extent to 
which Senators from the same party are willing to stand together on 
judicial nominations makes a big difference as to whether they can 
successfully filibuster or defeat nominations in Committee or on the 
Senate floor. The degree of cohesion or unity within a caucus is per-
tinent to how much power it can wield under the Senate rules and its 
influence in striking deals with the President. Sometimes Senators 
do not do what their party leaders or Presidents from their parties 
tell them. Sometimes divisions in the ranks of the Senators from the 
President’s party are a problem for many nominees, with some join-
ing members of the opposition party to defeat them.  
6.   The Blue-Slip Process 
  Another factor with potential influence on the confirmation proc-
ess is whether the (and which) blue-slip process is in place at the 
time of a nomination.81 The blue-slip process allows a Senator to 
block a nomination made to an office in that Senator’s home state. 
This process is usually available to Senators from both parties, but 
sometimes Presidents or Senate leaders have restricted it to Sena-
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tors only from the President’s party. If this process is in place in ei-
ther form, it expands Senators’ opportunities to block nominations. It 
particularly reinforces the strength of the majority party in the Sen-
ate. If that party is targeting the expression of support for particular 
policies or ideologies, then nominees who can be shown to have made 
such expressions face potentially serious obstacles to their confirma-
tion from the outset. 
 The blue-slip process for particular nominations can thus be 
shown in at least two ways. First, it can simply be shown as the 
number of times it has been invoked to block nominations. This 
number reflects its vitality at a given moment in the confirmation 
process. Alternatively, and perhaps more meaningfully, an empiricist 
can measure what, if any, characteristics nominations blocked 
through the blue-slip process had in common. The number of nomi-
nations with supposed ideological commitments that triggered sena-
torial concern can then be calculated. It will be a fraction of the total 
number blocked through the blue-slip process.  
7.   Numbers of Witnesses 
 The numbers of witnesses called for and against nominees are 
likely to be pertinent to their chances of success in the confirmation 
process. The number of people testifying, particularly against a 
nominee, is likely to signal some problem with the nomination. If 
more people are testifying against a nominee than for him or her, the 
nomination is almost certainly in trouble. Of course, these numbers 
alone do not indicate the reasons for support or opposition. Some 
people may be opposed because of the nominee’s supposed ideological 
commitments, but one must go behind these numbers in order to de-
termine this information. 
8.   The American Bar Association 
 The American Bar Association’s ratings on nominees may affect 
the fates of nominations. Positive ratings do not guarantee confirma-
tion, but negative or largely unfavorable ratings are bound to consid-
erably lower a nominee’s chances for confirmation. Even split ratings 
can be a problem (though not always fatal). The American Bar Asso-
ciation comes as close as any group to providing a “neutral” assess-
ment of a nominee’s qualifications, and its ratings may be used by ei-
ther side in a confirmation contest depending on the extent to which 
they are favorable or unfavorable. Thus, its assessment needs to be 
factored into any analysis of the process.  
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9.   Integrity 
 Nominees ought to get an integrity rating. We expect judicial 
nominees to be honest people, whose integrity is beyond reproach. 
More than a few judicial nominations have failed because of nomi-
nees’ ethical lapses. One problem (of many) torpedoing Clement 
Haynsworth’s nomination to the Supreme Court was his participa-
tion in some cases involving companies in which his wife had owned 
stock.82 Less than two decades later, Douglas Ginsburg asked Presi-
dent Reagan to withdraw his nomination as an Associate Justice be-
cause he had failed to inform the FBI during background checks that 
he had smoked marijuana while he was a tenured Harvard Law 
School professor.83 
10.   Merit 
 Of course, merit is a factor that cannot be ignored in evaluating 
the judicial selection process. The absence of merit, or questions 
about nominees’ qualifications, can be fatal to judicial (and of course 
many other) nominations. Even though we lack consensus on merit, 
it would be silly to dismiss it as irrelevant to the outcome of confir-
mation proceedings. In an empirical analysis of the selection process, 
we must, at the very least, measure the extent to which witnesses be-
fore the Judiciary Committee and members of the Committee focus 
on merit in their statements or questions. Presumably, the more it 
expressly comes up in hearings, the more potential impact it may 
have on a nomination’s fate. Of course, merit might be a red herring 
or a pretext. It is thus very important to give special attention to 
what those who come closest to being neutral observers or less-self-
interested parties have said about the merits of particular nomina-
tions. So we might give special weight to evaluations by the Ameri-
can Bar Association, or perhaps to leading scholars, on the merits of 
particular nominations. 
 Because so many people (particularly Republicans) have ques-
tioned the neutrality of the American Bar Association and of law pro-
fessors generally, one might have to look elsewhere for neutral or 
less-self-interested evaluators of merit. These are just nine factors, 
besides ideology, that are likely to affect the fates of judicial nomina-
tions. The odds are that judicial nominations will not founder simply 
because of one of these factors. Moreover, it is possible, if not likely, 
that the stated grounds of opposition to judicial nominations might 
not be entirely credible; they might reflect, at least to some extent, a 
pretext to oppose a nomination. For instance, the Judiciary Commit-
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tee never acted on President Clinton’s nomination of Elena Kagan to 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in 2000. She 
never got a hearing, much less a vote, on her nomination, in spite of 
her strong credentials. No one expressed opposition to her because of 
her ideology. Instead, opposition, to the extent it was ever manifest 
in public, focused more on whether the appellate court to which she 
had been nominated had a caseload to justify filling all of the seats to 
which the President had nominated people.84 Some people might view 
this opposition as merely a pretext to preclude the confirmation of 
someone whom the opposition party feared might be a liberal activist 
or who would then occupy a seat that it would have preferred for one 
of its own to occupy. After President Bush took office, Republican 
leaders acknowledged the court’s caseload justified filling all of its 
seats after all.85 And President Bush then nominated Miguel Estrada 
to one of them. It is possible that at least some opposition to the Es-
trada nomination derived in part from a desire for payback, though 
the grounds cited related to Estrada’s temperament and possible ju-
dicial ideology. While payback is another possible factor that needs to 
be monitored in the confirmation process, it is hard to verify, because 
Senators rarely (but sometimes do) acknowledge that it is the basis 
for their opposition. 
 In the final analysis, proving that ideology significantly affects the 
fates of nominations is not easy. Proving it may be so difficult that 
many people simply opt for anecdotal evidence or opt for merely ana-
lyzing the appeal of a particular nominee’s ideology. After all, it is 
not necessary to prove that all nominees shared commitments to 
problematic ideologies, but rather only the ones that Senators end up 
choosing to oppose for stated or unstated reasons. The higher, or 
more powerful, the court to which someone has been nominated, the 
more likely Senators will be concerned about the person’s likely judi-
cial ideology. It is thus likely that Senators will be more concerned 
with the likely ideologies of circuit court or Supreme Court nominees 
than district court nominees. In any event, as long as Senators do not 
fear the President, Senators remain relatively free to pick and choose 
which nominees to oppose and on what bases.  
V.   CONCLUSION 
 I close with a challenge. I challenge others to talk more openly 
about merit in judicial selection and particularly whether merit can 
be defined separately from ideology. If so, then we have to wonder 
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why more scholars, Presidents, and Senators do not do so. If not, 
then we need to explain why our apparent failure to separate merit 
from ideology ought not to lead us to simply join forces with the so-
cial scientists who believe that judges are nothing more than policy-
makers who just happen to wear robes. 
